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We solve the dynamic occupational choice problem of a finitelylived,  borrowing constrained household which 
faces exogenously given  stochastic wages and business returns. Entrepreneurship means investing  personal 
wealth into a risky asset and neither receiving wage  income nor paying social security contributions. Social 
security bene-  fits in retirement depend on the number of contribution periods. We  show that, entrepreneurial 
activity depends negatively on the generosity  of the social security system and non-monotically on the size of 
the  system. Numerical results for a multi-period version suggest that for  reasonable parameter values the 
relationship between the size of the  social security system and entrepreneurial activity is negative. In simulation  
experiments, we find that lowering social security contributions  for the young has a relatively larger effect on 
entrepreneurial activity  than other ways to reduce the size of the system. 
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          1 Introduction
The economic literature on social security reform and the implications of
ageing for existing social security systems has been growing enormously in
recent years. While the policy debate focuses very much on available options
to ensure the solvency of social security systems, the academic literature has
focused on the welfare evaluation of various pension reform proposals such as
the introduction of private occupational pensions and individual-based pen-
sion savings accounts. A relatively small part of the academic literature has
moved on to study the structural consequences of changing social security
systems for the labour market, capital markets and economic growth. In this
paper we study the eﬀects of changes in dependent employment-based social
security systems on the incentives for households to take entrepreneurial risk.
While the social security literature has recognized that earnings and rate of
return uncertainty, social risk sharing and the optimal amount of risk house-
holds assume through their portfolio decisions are central concepts for the
design of “optimal” social security systems, the interaction of social security
system design with entrepreneurial risk taking has been largely neglected so
far.
This is unfortunate, since there appears to be evidence that countries
in which the social security system is less generous and comprehensive, like
the United States and Great Britain, the propensity to take entrepreneurial
risk is higher than in other countries. Due to measurement problems that
are quite diﬃcult to overcome, there is relatively little comparable data on
the extent of entrepreneurial activity across countries however. Most of the
empirical literature on entrepreneurial risk-taking focuses on the share of
2business-owners and self-employed within the working-age population as an
indicator of entrepreneurial activity. Unfortunately, this measure does not
represent well the concept of entrepreneurial activity that we want to focus
on however. This stock measure does not capture well the dynamic element
of “creative destruction” and selection that has been stressed by Knight
(1921), Schumpeter (1934) and modern theories of endogenous growth based
on entrepreneurial activity and selection (see Aghion and Howitt (1992) or
Acemoglu, Aghion, and Zilibotti (2002)). These theories stress the fact that
a continuing process of technological innovation, market entry and selection
for which entrepreneurial risk-taking plays an important role drives economic
growth and that households must be compensated to be willing to take this
risk. The number of business start-ups or the share of households running
newly created private businesses or currently setting up private ﬁrms are
more likely to capture the dynamic element of entrepreneurial selection that
these endogenous growth theories refer to.
FIGURE 1
Figure 1 plots observations of an index of entrepreneurial activity and
social security contribution rates for some European countries and the US.
The data on entrepreneurial activity shown here are taken from an inter-
national survey conducted in 2002 by GEM (Reynolds, Bygrave, Autio,
Cox, and Hay (2003))1. For this survey, households are asked among other
things whether they are currently involved in the start-up of an enterprise
or whether they own and operate a business that is less than 42 months
1The survey has been conducted for various years with varying participation by coun-
tries. Data for Portugal are taken from the 2001 survey and for Greece from the 2003
survey.
3old. The Entrepreneurial Activity index represents the share of respondents
which answer “Yes” to one of these questions. In order to understand bet-
ter, whether the formation of a new business represents innovative activity,
households are also asked whether they start/run the business because they
see an economic opportunity, or whether they start/run the business for lack
of other options. The EA-index used in the ﬁgure refers only to “opportu-
nity” entrepreneurs, but results for a the combined index are similar. The
index is contrasted with data on the size of the social security system. We
measure the size of the system by the social security contribution rate. The
rates used only cover the contributions made for old-age, survivor and dis-
ability pensions. They do not include unemployment, sickness or accident
insurance contributions. In itself of course, this evidence is not suﬃcient to
establish a negative relation between entrepreneurial activity and the size of
the social security system, because other factors like the state of demand,
the availability of credit and business regulations or the tax code clearly
are important determinants of household’s occupational choice decisions as
well. In empirical work, it is important to control for these diﬀerences. How-
ever, the graph at least shows that there is a suspicious correlation between
these two phenomena across countries and we therefore interpret Figure 1
as suggesting the possibility of a negative relationship between the size of
the social security system and the extent of entrepreneurial activity within
a country. Interestingly, this empirical ﬁnding is in contrast with the pre-
vious theoretical literature on the topic, which suggested a positive impact
of social security on entrepreneurial activity through a risk-sharing eﬀect
(see for example Boadway, Marchand, and Pestieau (1991)). An important
assumption in these models is that the coverage by social security system
4is as encompassing for entrepreneurs than for worker. We slightly reﬁne
this assumption by assuming that all households are covered by the social
security system, but that social security contributions are wage-based and
that the magnitude of social security beneﬁts increases with the number
of contribution years. We further generalize these models by considering
borrowing-constraints for households and ﬁxed costs of business startups.
We analyze the relationship between entrepreneurial risk-taking by house-
holds and the design of the social security system in the context of a dy-
namic occupational choice model, based on Evans and Jovanovic (1989) and
Hintermaier and Steinberger (2005), which formalizes the idea that the so-
cial security system aﬀects the extent of entrepreneurial risk taking in an
economy. The model is set in a partial equilibrium context, taking the dis-
tribution of wages and private business returns as given. Analytical results
are derived for the 2-period case, in which the occupational choice deci-
sion is mutually exclusive and households decide once and for all whether
to work for a risky wage or become entrepreneurs by investing some part
of their wealth in a risky asset. This section shows how the initial wealth
of households aﬀects the occupational choice decision2 a n dt h a ti ng e n e r a l
there is an inversely U-shaped relationship between the size of the social
security system and entrepreneurial activity. To the left of the individually
optimal social security contribution rate, increasing the size of the social
welfare system raises the welfare of workers while leaving the welfare of en-
trepreneurs unchanged. This reduces the incentive to take entrepreneurial
2In the 2-period version, starting a business is equivalent to business ownership for the
entire working life, since agents make their occupational choice decision only once in a
lifetime.
5risk. To the right of the individually optimal social security contribution
rate, the opposite holds. For a given distribution of initial wealth, there is
therefore a non-monotonic relationship between the size of the social secu-
rity system and the extent of entrepreneurial activity in the economy. With
respect to the generosity of the social security system, the analytical results
are more clear-cut. A larger internal rate of return of the social security
system unambiguously increases worker welfare without aﬀecting the wel-
fare of entrepreneurs. The extent of entrepreneurial activity in the economy
therefore decreases in response to an increase in the generosity of the social
security system.
We test the robustness of our analytical ﬁndings by analyzing numeri-
cally the multi-period version of our dynamic occupational choice model. In
the multi-period case, households decide each period on whether to be an
entrepreneur or to work for a wage. The interactions between the social secu-
rity system and entrepreneurial activity are therefore much more interesting.
Households are able to build up private savings and start businesses later in
their careers. They can also learn about the proﬁtability of their business
and revert back to employee status, if the business is unproﬁtable. The ele-
ment of “entrepreneurial discovery” is captured fully only in this case. Also,
the social security system provides a low-risk saving vehicle for the house-
holds, which tilts the portfolio choice of all households towards investing in
the risky asset. We ﬁnd again that everything else equal, the generosity of
the pension system (measured by the internal rate of return) is negatively
related to entrepreneurial risk-taking, because a more generous pension sys-
tem makes wage work and saving through the social security system more
6attractive. For our calibration, also increasing the size of the social security
system reduces the extent of entrepreneurial activity because private sav-
ings are reduced and also private business investment is lower. Additional
experiments indicate that higher social security contributions early in the
life-cycle reduce available resources at a point in time in which they are very
valuable for prospective entrepreneurs. A high contribution rate for young
households slows down the buildup of savings by these cohorts and aﬀects
adversely the extent of entrepreneurial activity at later ages. This mecha-
nism reduces the share of entrepreneurs in the population, especially among
young households starting out with low initial wealth. Reducing the social
security contribution rates of the young households is therefore an eﬀective
way of aﬀecting entrepreneurial activity in the economy.
Section 2 introduces the model and the 2-period version is solved in sec-
tion 3. In section 4 we explain how the model is adapted to a multi-period
framework and discuss calibration issues. Section 5 reports simulation re-
sults from the numerical solution of the model and we discuss the limitations
of our analysis and the conclusions we draw from our analysis in section 6.
The appendix contains a description of the computational methods we use
to solve the multi-period case.
2 A life-cycle model of occupational choice
Lifetime is stochastic with δt denoting the survival probability from period
t−1 to period t, conditional on survival until period t−1. Individuals have
a maximum lifetime of T periods and discount utility at a constant and
exogenous rate β.W ei m p o s eﬁxed retirement at the end of period P.
7Consequently, household i maximizes the discounted sum of period util-
















where E0 denotes the expectation conditional on information available
at time zero, cit denotes consumption of household i in period t and u(.)
is a Von Neumann-Morgenstern utility function. Bit denotes the amount of
wealth invested in a private business during period t and Wit denotes total
household wealth.
During working-life households have to choose between wage work and
managing their own business. The budget constraint reads
cit = 1(Bit =0 )( 1− τ)wit+(1+r)Wit−Wit+1+(ρit−r)Bit−Ψ(Bit−1,B it)
(2)
for periods t =1 ,..,P. In retirement, households cannot run their own
business anymore and can only invest their private wealth in the publicly
traded asset. Therefore the budget constraint changes to
cit = vit +( 1+r)Wit − Wit+1 (3)
for the periods t = P +1 ,....,T. We further assume a borrowing constraint
on the publicly available asset and a collateral constraint for investment in
the private business.
0 · Bit · Wit,W it ≥ 0,∀t
The ﬁrst term on the right hand side of the working-life budget con-
straint, 1(Bit =0 )( 1− τ)wit, represents the stochastic wage income of the
8household net of social security contributions, where τ is the ﬁxed propor-
tional contribution rate of the social security system. If the household holds
positive amounts of business wealth, this term equals zero because we assume
that entrepreneurial households spend their entire working time managing
the ﬁrm. Wage income has an age-dependent deterministic component
¯ wt = at2 + bt + c, for 1 · t · P





¯ wt + εit for 1 · t · P




The stochastic component of wage income εit represents uninsurable idio-
syncratic labour market risk that follows a simple AR(1) process
εit = φεit−1 + ξit
with ξit being an iid shock distributed as
ξit ∼ N (0,σξ)
and εi0 is drawn from the invariant distribution of εt.
The second and third term, (1 + r)Wit − Wit+1, capture current income
from and future investment into a riskless, publicly traded asset. All house-
holds can invest their wealth into this asset, which delivers an exogenous and
ﬁxed rate of return r that is not subject to taxation. Entrepreneurial house-
holds additionally have the option to invest in their own business, which is
captured by the last two terms, (ρit − r)Bit − Ψ(Bit−1,B it). (ρit − r)Bit
denotes the income in excess of the ﬁnancial market rate of return derived
9from the private business, and Ψ(Bit−1,B it) measures transaction costs as-
sociated with private business investment. We specify transaction costs to
capture the idea that private business investment is subject to a ﬁxed startup
cost Ψ(Bit−1,B it)=1(Bit =0 ,B it+1 > 0)Φ. The gross stochastic return of
the private business is the sum of two stochastic components and a constant
log(ρit)=¯ ρ + ηit + ρεit for 1 · t · P
where ¯ ρ denotes the mean proﬁtability of all potential businesses, ρεit in-
troduces correlation between wage income and business returns and the
business return risk component ηit again follows an AR(1)-process
ηit = θηit−1 + ζit
where ζit is an iid shock distributed as
ζit ∼ N (0,σζ)
and ηi0 is drawn from the invariant distribution of ηt. It is important that
households cannot observe the current realization of ηit unless they own
a business. In the retirement period, private businesses do not generate
a positive return. There is no agreement in the literature on whether ηi0
and εi0 or ζit and ξit should be correlated or not. Evans and Jovanovic
(1989) argue that there is some evidence that entrepreneurial ability and
wage ability are negatively correlated, but assume that the equivalents to
these quantities are uncorrelated for reasons of tractability. We follow their
assumption and also assume no correlation.
During retirement household i receives a non-stochastic pension beneﬁt,
constant throughout retirement and dependent on the number of contribu-
tion years. Households, which accumulate less than M worker contribution
10years mi, receive a minimum pension ¯ v. Because the pension beneﬁto n l y
depends on the number of contribution years, the public retirement system
provides partial insurance against low wage realizations for workers. Because
entrepreneurial households do not receive a wage, they cannot contribute to
the public retirement system and do not accumulate beneﬁts on top of the






















where g is the internal rate of return of the pension system. This simple
formula obviously does not do justice to the complicated real-world bene-
ﬁt calculation rules, but captures a trade-oﬀ between entrepreneurial risk-
taking and saving through the social security system which is inherent also
in the more complicated systems.
In the next section, we will analyze the model in the 2-period case to
derive some qualitative results. Sections 4 and 5 will be devoted to the
numerical analysis of a multiperiod version of the model.
3T h e 2 - p e r i o d c a s e
Setting T =2and P =1allows for a drastic reduction in the complexity
of the model. With these simpliﬁcations the model essentially contains a
0− 1 choice between becoming an entrepreneur or a worker during working
life. By choosing between entrepreneurship and wage work households also
choose between getting a full pension or a minimum pension. Under the
additional assumptions that the minimum pension and startup costs are





ci1 =( 1 − e)(1− τ)wi1 +( 1+r)Wi1 − Wi2 + e(ρi1 − r)Bi1
ci2 =( 1 + g)τ ¯ w1 (1 − e)+( 1+r)Wi2
(1 − e)Bi1 =0 ,W i2 ≥ 0 and 0 · Bi1 · αWi1
Here we have replaced the indicator function 1(Bit =0 )in the budget con-
straint with an equivalent indicator variable, e, which takes on the value 0 if
the household decides to work for a wage and 1 if the household chooses to
be an entrepreneur. In the 2-period case, the random variables wi1 and ρi1
are distributed as N (¯ w1,σξ) and N (¯ ρ,σζ) assuming implicitly that both w0
and ρ0 are equal to 0 for all households.
Figure 2 shows the timeline of events in the 2-period-model. Random
variables are realized at the end of each period but prior to the consumption
decision such that households know their private realizations when making
their consumption-saving decision . This assumption yields a deterministic
Euler equation to determine the level of savings Wi2.
FIGURE 2
3.1 Optimal decisions
Households choose e to maximize V ∗ =m a x( Ve=0,V e=1).F o rt h ec h o i c eo f
Bi1 and Wi2, we have the following necessary conditions.
12u0(ci1) − βδ2 (1 + r)u0(ci2)=λWi2≥0 (5)
eE0 [u0(ci1)(ρi1 − r)] = λBi1≤αWi1 − λBi1≥0 − λBi1(1−e)=0 (6)
which together with the decision about e determine the solution of the
occupational choice and consumption problem3.T h e ﬁrst equation is a
standard, constrained Euler equation, determining the choice of savings Wi2.
The second equation gives the optimal amount of investment in the ﬁrst
period, Bi1, and is relevant only for entrepreneurs.
Households who decide to take up wage work must also choose Bi1 =0
and equation (6) is therefore trivially fulﬁlled. They choose their optimal
consumption levels and retirement savings in accordance with the Euler
equation
u0((1 − τ)wi1 +( 1+r)Wi1 − Wi2)
= βδ2 (1 + r)u0((1 + g)τ ¯ w1 +( 1+r)Wi2)+λWi2≥0 (7)
Households who take entrepreneurial risk, set e =1and additionally
choose Bi1 according to
E0 [u0((1 + r)Wi1 − Wi2 +( ρi1 − r)Bi1)(ρi1 − r)] = λBi1≤αWi1 (8)
when ρi1 is still random. Notice that the choice of Bi1 could be con-
strained by the level of initial wealth of the household which is captured
3While the Euler equations are deterministic, randomness of wi1 and ρi1does aﬀect the
value functions and hence also aﬀects the choice of e.
13through the multiplier λBi1≤αWi1. The deterministic Euler equation of en-
trepreneurial households has the following form
u0((1 + r)Wi1 − Wi2 +( ρi1 − r)Bi1)
= βδ2 (1 + r)u0((1 + r)Wi2)+λWi2≥0 (9)
and Wi2 is again determined after the realization of the business return ρi1
was observed.
By substituting the optimal choices of Wi2 and Bi1 into the value func-
tions Ve=0 and Ve=1, we obtain the solution to the household problem. Figure
3 shows a graph of the two value functions and the selection into entrepre-
neurship depending on the level of initial wealth Wi1.
FIGURE 3
3.2 The social security system and occupational choice
After characterizing the general solution, we will now show the relationship
between the size of the social security system and occupational choice. To
obtain our analytical results, we choose a standard form of utility which
makes the model more tractable and from now on assume that utility is of
the CRRA-type, u(cit)=cit
1−γ
1−γ , γ > 0. The main object under study in this
section is the value function for workers Ve=0, because the value function for
entrepreneurs is not aﬀected by variation in τ. We show that up to a thresh-
old level ¯ τ the value function of these workers Ve=0 is increasing in τ and
hence that some social security is desirable from the point of view of uncon-
14strained workers in this model4. Constrained workers would like to borrow
against future income and would thereforea l w a y sp r e f e ral o w e rc o n t r i b u t i o n
rate. Whether a given worker household is constrained or unconstrained es-
sentially depends on the level of initial wealth Wi1 and the household’s wage
income realization wi1. In the following, we assume that the initial wealth
distribution is such that all workers would like to save a positive amount
Wi2 > 0. Obviously, because the occupational choice decision is mutually
exclusive, there is a disincentive eﬀect on taking entrepreneurial risk from
the increase in the value function for workers.
This can be shown by comparing the threshold levels for taking entrepre-
neurial risk with and without social security. Under our assumption about
the functional form of utility, the optimal savings decision for a worker saving
ap o s i t i v ea m o u n tWi2 > 0 is given by
Wi2 =
(1 − τ)wi1 +( 1+r)Wi1
1+δ∗ + δ∗r
−
(δ∗ + δ∗g)τ ¯ w1
1+δ∗ + δ∗r
where δ∗ =( βδ2 (1 + r))
− 1
γ is an intertemporal discount factor which cap-
tures the joint eﬀect on savings of time preference, stochastic mortality,
real rate of interest and the desire to smooth consumption over time. Sub-
stituting into the budget constraint, we obtain analytical expressions for
consumption in period 1 and 2.
ci1 =
δ∗ (1 + r)
1+δ∗ + δ∗r
((1 − τ)wi1 +( 1+r)Wi1)+











4Making it possible for agents to use accrued social security beneﬁts as collateral for
consumption credit (thereby eliminating the borrowing constraint on Wi2) would eliminate
the threshold level ¯ τ and allow full diversiﬁcation of wage risk.
15Plugging these expressions back into the objective function and recognizing
that the realization of income is initially unknown, we obtain the solution






















If g = r, we obtain sharp conclusions: any unconstrained worker prefers
a social security tax rate of 100%, because this enables him to fully share
his labor income risk. This requires however, that the worker fully ﬁnances
ﬁrst-period consumption out of initial assets, which are likely to be too low
for many households. For constrained workers, the optimal social security
contribution rate is positive, but less than 100%,i nt h i sc a s e .I fg<r ,w h i c h
is the standard assumption, the desired contribution rate falls further, be-
cause there is also a loss of lifetime wealth associated with taxation through
the social security system. In summary, unless the internal rate of return
g is too low and hence the implicit price of insurance too high, there is a
positive threshold level τ∗
i for each individual up to which social security is
desirable for the household and raises the value of lifetime utility. Figure 4
shows the value functions for two households with diﬀerent levels of initial
wealth and g = r.H o u s e h o l d1 is endowed with a large initial wealth and
is therefore unconstrained in his savings choice. This household also has
a much higher valuation of entrepreneurship. Household 2 instead has a
low level of initial wealth, with an interior optimum for the social security
contribution rate and a low valuation of entrepreneurship.
16FIGURE 4
What matters for occupational choice is the comparison between Ve=0
and Ve=1. There are three possible cases: Households can be indiﬀerent
about τ because they would always choose entrepreneurship for any value of
τ. Another possibility is that households prefer the corner solution τ∗
i =1
because they have high initial wealth Wi1. These households will choose en-
trepreneurship for low contribution rates and remain entrepreneurial house-
holds as τ increases up to some threshold τ2. Households with a somewhat
lower level of τ∗
i will have a preference for entrepreneurship only if τ is very
low. As τ increases, their worker value function increases as well, inducing
them eventually to choose worker status. Only for very high levels of τ,s a y
τ3, the wealth constraint they are facing for consumption in the ﬁrst period
becomes so important that even higher τ induces these households to choose
entrepreneurial activity. There is hence generally a U-shaped relationship
between the size of the social security system and the extent of entrepreneur-
ial activity. With respect to the generosity of the system, parametrized by
the internal rate of return g, the conclusion is more straightforward. Higher
g increases the attractiveness of the worker occupation without changing the
value of entrepreneurship. The implication of this result is quickly stated.
Since occupational choice is 0 − 1 in the 2-period model, raising the value
function of workers means creating disincentives for entrepreneurial risk tak-
ing and hence fewer households will choose to become entrepreneurs, if the
social security system is more generous.
While the 2-period model conveys some insights into the relationship
between social security and occupational choice, it does not fully capture
17the nature of entrepreneurial risk-taking, which allows households to “try”
entrepreneurship for a short period of time. In the next section, we therefore
explore to which extent the results extend to the multi-period case in which
successive spells of entrepreneurship and work are possible by calibrating
and solving numerically a 35-period version of the model.
4 Numerical results for the multiperiod extension
While the theoretical results obtained in the previous section are quite in-
sightful and convey important aspects of the relationship between entrepre-
neurial risk-taking and social security it suﬀers from an important drawback:
occupational choice is a 0− 1 decision in the 2-period case. Especially with
respect to entrepreneurial risk-taking such a setting does not capture an
important aspect of risk taking in a multi-period setting: feedback from the
market allows entrepreneurs to learn about the proﬁtability of their busi-
ness and eventually close it down. This learning eﬀect is emphasized by
Jovanovic (1982) and Hopenhayn (1992) and constitutes an important part
of the process of market selection. Entry and exit can be accommodated in
our framework by allowing for multiple periods, serially correlated business
returns and imperfect information about business proﬁtability. In this set-
ting households can try entrepreneurship, ﬁnd out about the proﬁtability
of their business and eventually return to employee status or start another
business. This more involved structure of the model allows us to study
how incentives for this dynamic aspect of entrepreneurship are aﬀected by
changes in parameters of the social security system. We expect the general
ideas of the previous section to hold: up to some threshold level, a positive
18social security tax rate increases welfare of workers by oﬀering insurance
against wage uncertainty and a more generous pension system will lead
more households to choose employee status, but other elements come into
play. High contribution rates at young ages drain resources from households
who would consider entrepreneurship and reenforce the negative eﬀect of the
social security system on entrepreneurial activity. Pension beneﬁtr u l e sa l s o
become important. Rules for pension provision that require households to
remain dependently employed over a large part of the working life to receive
a pension introduce strong marginal disincentives for workers with an in-
complete employee contribution record and discourage workers from taking
entrepreneurial risk.
In the next section we describe the implementation of the social security
system in the multi-period model and discuss the calibration of the model
using data from the US. We solve and simulate the calibrated versions of the
model and report baseline and comparative statics results. A description of
the numerical procedure used to solve the model is given in the appendix.
4.1 The design of the pension system
Most advanced economies have set up some form of universal coverage of
citizens by the social security system. This coverage extends to both beneﬁts
and contributions and it is generally not possible to opt out of the social
security system completely by choosing a particular occupation. At least
a basic level of social assistance in old age is guaranteed for all citizens.
In order to receive larger payments of social security beneﬁts a history of
19regular contributions to the social security system is required however5.T h e
speciﬁcation of the pension system in the multi-period setting follows this
general pattern. Both employee status and entrepreneurship provide some
social insurance, but only employees participate in a more extensive system
with a higher contribution rate and the level of beneﬁts linked to the number
of years worked.
We implement a simpliﬁed social security system that remains close to
these stylized features of real-world social security systems, but does not
increase computational costs too much. The social security budget is bal-
anced, if in an economy with J households of each age t and a constant

























where the beneﬁtf o r m u l ai sg i v e nb y4 .O u rd e ﬁnition of the pension beneﬁt
formula implies that the social security budget is always balanced, if there
are no entrepreneurial households and the growth rate of labour productivity
is 0. Then both sides of 10 approximately equal P
P X
t=1
τ exp( ¯ wt).A p o s i -
tive share of entrepreneurial households and a positive labour productivity
growth rate would require that the social security system parameters M, ¯ v,
and τ are chosen in such a way that the social security budget is balanced.
In our calibration exercise we choose the values of these parameters as close
as possible to the empirically observed ones, leaving open the possibility
5Most countries also have special, generous schemes for some professions, but since
entry into these occupations usually is not free and this option therefore often not available
to the majority of households we do not take into account these special regulations.
20that the system is not exactly balanced in each period, which has been the
case historically in most countries.
We have ﬁxed the retirement age for all occupational groups at P =2 1
and disregard the retirement decision of households. Studying the retire-
ment decision of various occupational groups seriously would require a much
more involved structure with endogenous labour supply choice, unemploy-
ment and retirement disincentives of the social security system. Including
these features would increase computational costs very much and there is no
empirical evidence that entrepreneurial activity around the retirement age is
quantitatively important. Our beneﬁt formula 4 takes a somewhat extreme
case of a strongly intergenerationally redistributive system by making bene-
ﬁts dependent only on the number of contribution periods. This assumption
is made to reduce computational costs and avoid introducing another contin-
uous state variable, “accrued pension wealth”, into the model. The number
of contribution periods is suﬃcient as a state variable in our implementa-
tion. Most social security systems are characterized by a requirement for
a minimum number of contribution periods to be eligible for beneﬁts. We
introduce this feature as well and also stipulate that to obtain the full ben-
eﬁt agents have to be working as an employee for their entire working-life.
Becoming an entrepreneur for some period of time hence implies a loss of
beneﬁts proportional to the amount of time spent in self-employment.
4.2 Baseline calibration
The multi-period simulation is carried out over a total horizon of 35 periods.
We assume that agents enter the model at age 20 and every period represents
212 years of life. Total lifetime therefore corresponds to 90 years and we
set a ﬁxed retirement date at the end of the 21st period, corresponding
to age 62. The utility function is again assumed to have the CRRA-form
(cit)=cit
1−γ
1−γ , γ > 0 and we set relative risk aversion to γ =2 . The discount
rate β is assumed to be 0.97 and the net risk-free return r equals 0.025
annually. All of these parameters are standard choices in the literature.
The calibration of the wage income process is taken from a detailed study
of household saving choices in the US by Laibson, Repetto, and Tobacman
(1998). These authors estimate age-income proﬁles for various educational
groups from PSID data. We select the median educational group (high
school diploma) for which the deterministic age polynomial is estimated as
¯ wt =e x p ( 8 .835 + 0.058t − 0.017t2/100 − 0.055t3/10000).W e c o n v e r t t h e
income process to a 2 year-frequency by time-aggregation. The resulting
autocorrelation coeﬃcient φ of the stochastic wage process is equal to 0.473
and the variance of the innovation to log income σ2
ξ is 0.0766.D r a w s o f
initial wealth are taken from a lognormal distribution, using the empirical
mean of the US wealth distribution for the youngest cohort obtained from
the 1998 Survey of Consumer Finances and the corresponding coeﬃcient
of variation of 6.53 both reported by Budria, Diaz-Gimenez, Quadrini, and
Rios-Rull (2002). In the aggregation we use population weights from the
1998 issue of the CPS (Current Population Survey), truncated below age 20,
and assume a long-run real income growth rate of 1%.T a b l e1 summarizes
the choices of parameters that were taken from the literature.
Table 1:
Table 2 reports the choices for parameters that are not readily available
22in the literature and which concern the features of the entrepreneurial in-
come process and the transaction costs associated with private businesses.
We set the mean of log annual net private business returns to 0.13 to cre-
ate suﬃcient incentives to run private businesses and introduce substantial
serial return correlation by choosing θ =0 .88. Business return innovations
have relatively small variance of 0.005, but 1-period realized net returns
nevertheless vary substantially ranging from −9% to 92%.S t a r t u p c o s t s
are chosen to be substantial with the chosen value for Φ implying costs
of about $18,000 or about one mean annual wage income of very young
workers. Startup costs interact with the borrowing and short-selling con-
straints on households to limit entrepreneurial activity of young households.
Finally, the parameter governing the correlation between wage income and
business return realizations ρ is set to 0.15, implying a positive correlation of
0.278. Since households receive either wage income or business income, and
households are always aware of their wage risk realizations the correlation
between these two forms of income is not important for the portfolio deci-
sions of households. These ﬁve parameters are set to match approximately,
the empirically observed shares of business ownership and entrepreneurial
activity in the US economy as observed by Gentry and Hubbard (2000) and
the 2002 GEM study.
Table 2
Table 3 reports the baseline parameters of the pension system. We set
the minimum number of contribution periods to receive a pension to 18
years and the social security tax rate on gross wage income, τ,t o12.5%,
corresponding to the current social security system contribution rate in the
23US. We set the minimum social security beneﬁtt o480$ on a monthly basis
and the full employment history beneﬁtt o1,121$ monthly.
Table 3
The next section reports results from simulation experiments in order
to gauge the quantitative impact of changes in parameters of the social
security system and to check whether the theoretical predictions of the 2-
period model extend to the multi-period case.
5 Simulation experiments
We determine the simulated impact of changes in parameters of the social
security system by comparing the numerical solutions obtained from our
model for various sets of parameters. This implies that we cannot make
statements about the transitional path of the economy, as it moves from
one set of parameters to the other and we have to bear in mind that the
stochastic processes for wages and business returns are assumed to be ﬁxed
when interpreting the results. As usual in a partial equilibrium study, the
model presumes a stationary equilibrium of the aggregate economy and the
simulation results can therefore only be interpreted as indications for the
long-run consequences of parameter changes if the aggregate wage and re-
turn dynamics are not aﬀected strongly by parametric changes in the social
security.
In order to compare our model solutions, we ﬁrst ﬁx matrices of shock
realizations, Zw and Zb, for wage and business return risk. We simulate a
population of N = 100000 households and these matrices have dimensions
24(P × N) and (P2 × N), respectively. We also ﬁx a vector initial assets of
length N, drawn from our calibrated distribution. Starting from the initial
asset position , we apply the policy rules computed through the algorithm
described in the appendix to recover the optimal asset and consumption
paths for the households given the shock realizations. From these sets of
paths, we draw the inferences described below.
5.1 Sensitivity to social security system parameters
The baseline calibration yields a business owner share of 8.86% in the pop-
ulation and an entrepreneur activity index of 4.97. Most businesses are
relatively young and the average age of ﬁrms is 10.1 years (the median age
is 4 periods = 8 years). The number of startup ﬁrms, deﬁned as ﬁrms at
age 1 or 2 periods is 3,056 in the baseline calibration, which amounts to a
share of 3.06% of young business owners in the population. Using the 1998
population weights, the social security system is slightly overfunded given
the parameters of the social security system and hence aggregate contribu-
tion payments somewhat exceed aggregate beneﬁtp a y o u t s .A b o u t30% of
private savings is held in the form of private business assets.
We now report the comparative statics results from the solution and
simulation of the model after changing two important social security para-
meters one at a time. The ﬁrst of these parameters is the size of the social
security system, captured by τ. The second of these parameters is the gen-
erosity of the social security system captured by the internal rate of return
g. Changing the size of the social security system from 12.5% to 13.5%
percent aﬀects the level of entrepreneurial activity negatively. We therefore
25conﬁrm the results of the 2-period case also for the multiperiod model. By
raising the amount of contributions, we also increase the implied retirement
beneﬁt su s i n gf o r m u l a4w h i c hr i s et o$1210 for the full employment history
beneﬁta n d$518 for the minimum pension. As expected, increasing the size
of the social security system leads to a drop in aggregate private savings by
4.62%. The business owner share in the population drops to 8.18% and the
entrepreneur activity index to 4.55. Average ﬁrm age rises to 10.36 years
and the number of startup ﬁrms decreases by 8.4%. The main reason for the
decrease in entrepreneurial activity is the drop in private savings, which is
quite pronounced. Both the share of savings invested in private businesses
and the number of private businesses are smaller, if forced saving through
the social security system is increased. Average business size is slightly
higher however, which implies that the reduction in savings leads to fewer
small and young businesses in the ﬁrm population. From the perspective
of households, households with low initial assets are most aﬀected in their
occupational choice by the change in the size of the social security system.
We obtain somewhat weaker eﬀects from increasing the generosity of the
social security system. Even increasing the full employment history beneﬁt
by 10% from 1,121$ to 1,230$ monthly while leaving the minimum social
security payment unchanged, aﬀects negatively the incentives to take entre-
preneurial risk. This again conﬁrms our results from the 2-period model.
But quantitatively, the eﬀect is much smaller. The share of business owners
now is 8.38% and the entrepreneurial activity index reads 4.66. Again, the
reduction in entrepreneurial activity is caused by a reduction in aggregate
private savings, which decrease by 2.82%.
26An interesting result emerges from comparing two ways of reducing the
size of the social security system. In the ﬁrst computational experiment,
social security contributions are cut for every working households by 1 per-
centage point from 12.5% to 11.5% percent. In the other experiment, only
young households beneﬁt from a cut in social security contribution rates,
and the reduction is larger for them: τ is decreased from 12.5% to 6.25%
for households in the initial 5 periods. In sum, the changes in the contri-
bution rates have almost identical eﬀects on retirement beneﬁts. The full
employment history beneﬁt decreases to 1031$ monthly in the ﬁrst case, and
to 1028$ monthly in the case where the reduction is focused on the young.
The minimum beneﬁti s440$ per month in both experiments. Despite the
similar magnitude of the cuts in the size of the social security system, the
second experiment induces a noticably stronger eﬀect on entrepreneurial ac-
tivity and private savings than the ﬂat reduction. In the second case, the
business owner share increases to 10.08% and the entrepreneurial activity
index is 5.68, 0.59 percentage points and 0.22 points higher than in the
ﬁrst experiment, respectively. Aggregate savings and the share of savings
invested in private businesses are higher in both experiments than in the
baseline case, but the quantitative eﬀect is higher in the second experiment
again. Figure 4 compares the absolute diﬀerences with respect to the base-
line case of startup rates by age for three of the four experiments we have
discussed here.
FIGURE 5
The ﬁgure shows that startup rates vary the most from age 35 to 55.
Before age 35, households are severely borrowing constrained in our model
27a n do n l yh i g hs k i l l - h i g hi n i t i a lw e a l th households own a private business.
The eﬀect on startup rates from cutting social security contributions for the
young is strongest for households in their 40’s. At that age households which
have beneﬁted from the low social security contribution rates and faced the
prospect of low retirement beneﬁts arrive with higher private wealth than
households in the baseline simulation. Hence, they ﬁnd entrepreneurship
more attractive and decide to start a business. Older households also start
businesses more often if social security contributions by the young are cut,
but for households in their 50’s, the experiment with a ﬂat cut of contribu-
tion rates for every household yields an even stronger eﬀect on startup rates.
The strongest eﬀect on business startup rates by households close to retire-
ment age is provided by a change in the generosity of the system. A more
generous system discourages these households to attempt entrepreneurship
and induces them to continue accumulating pension wealth, which they do
at a higher rate than in the baseline case. Startup behaviour up to age 40 is
not aﬀected at all by changes in the generosity of the social security system.
6C o n c l u s i o n s
We have shown in a dynamic model of occupational choice how the size and
generosity of the welfare system are linked to incentives for entrepreneurial
risk-taking. For borrowing-constrained households, the propensity to invest
in a privately-owned business depends on the household’s current wealth.
In a stylized 2-period version of the model, occupational choice is mutually
exclusive and households decide whether to be entrepreneurs or workers only
once in a lifetime. In that case, we ﬁnd that the relationship between the
28size of the welfare system and entrepreneurial activity is inversely U-shaped.
To the left of the individually optimal social security contribution rate, in-
creasing the size of the welfare system raises the welfare of workers while
leaving the welfare of entrepreneurs unchanged. This reduces the incentive
to take entrepreneurial risk. To the right of the individually optimal social
security contribution rate, the opposite holds. A larger internal rate of re-
turn of the pension system however unambiguously increases worker welfare
without aﬀecting the welfare of entrepreneurs. For a given distribution of
initial wealth and given income possibilities the extent of entrepreneurial
activity in the economy therefore decreases in response to an increase in
the generosity of the social security system and responds non-monotically
to increase in the size of the social security system.
To learn more about the relationship between the size of the social se-
curity system and the extent of entrepreneurial activity we have analyzed
numerically the multi-period case, calibrating the stochastic processes for
wages and business returns to exhibit considerable serial correlation, in-
cluding ﬁxed startup costs for private businesses and allowing households
to choose their occupational status in every period. The magnitude of so-
cial security beneﬁts granted to households depends on the amount of years
spent in dependent employment and hence on the number of contribution
years, but does not depend directly on the sum of contributions, and there
is a minimum beneﬁt granted to every household, even those who have not
contributed anything to the system. These social insurance features of the
system provide positive incentives for households to take entrepreneurial risk
(this point was emphasized by Boadway, Marchand, and Pestieau (1991)).
29We calibrate the model to match empirical features of the US economy and
solve the model using numerical dynamic programming techniques. Simu-
lations experiments suggest that for reasonable parameter values the rela-
tionship between the size of the social security system and entrepreneurial
activity is negative, because both total private savings and private business
investment. We also ﬁnd again that the generosity of the pension system
(measured by the internal rate of return) is negatively related to entrepre-
neurial risk-taking, because a more generous pension system makes wage
work and saving through the social security system more attractive. The
strongest eﬀect on entrepreneurial activity is provided by changes in the
social security contribution rate of the young households, because those
households are the most constrained and additional resources allow them to
improve their lifetime welfare by taking more entrepreneurial risk.
Whether policy conclusions can be drawn from this analysis depends
strongly on whether the partial equilibrium perspective that we are taking
is empirically relevant and whether entrepreneurial activity in our sense af-
fects the long-run growth rate as hypothesized by the Schumpeterian growth
theories. If the latter is the case, the dynamic eﬀects of increasing entre-
preneurial activity by reducing the size of the social security system are
important. If, in the other hand, classical growth theory is a more accurate
representation of the growth process and technological progress is largely
independent of the extent of entrepreneurial risk-taking by households, then
increasing entrepreneurial activity will have only static, redistributive eﬀects
and the rationale for implementing these changes is much weaker.
307A p p e n d i x
7.1 Computational method
With our choice of utility function, the main source of problems in the an-
alytical analysis of entrepreneurial portfolio choice under uncertainty is the
borrowing constraint and the fact that investment into the ﬁrm is subject
to adjustment costs and imperfect information. These features make the
saving allocation problem inherently dynamic. The reason for this is that
the expected rate of return on investment into the private business asset
depends on whether a positive amount is invested and second, that there
are ﬁxed costs of starting a business. Our informational assumptions imply
that the saving allocation problem of households is a problem of optimal
sequential experimentation (sometimes also called “bandit” problems). Dy-
namic programming techniques are very well suited to study this kind of
problems. The computational method we use is ﬁnite state, ﬁnite horizon
dynamic programming with a continuous approximation of the value func-
tion in the wealth dimension. We discretize the state space, deﬁned over
total wealth, portfolio shares and uncertainty states. We use a grid of 45
points in the wealth dimension and a grid of 3 points in the portfolio choice
dimension. The uncertainty grids are 5 and 3 grid points wide and equally
spaced on the interval [− s t d .d e v . ,s t d .d e v . ]. This amounts to a total of
45 ∗ 3 ∗ 5 ∗ 3 = 2025 gridpoints on the value function at each age and for
each feasible value of the number of contribution periods.
The problem is solved recursively backward, starting from a value func-
tion equal to 0 in the last period. Fineness of the grids basically determines
computation time, which is linear in lifetime. During retirement, households
31are not allowed to run a business and their income is deterministic such that
the solution of their optimal consumption-savings decision is simple and rel-
atively fast due to the use of continuous approximation techniques using
orthogonal polynomials. The maximization step at each node of the grid is
carried out via a line-search algorithm that does not require the computa-
tion of numerical derivatives. In working age, households face a complicated
dynamic portfolio choice problem in addition to the consumption-saving
decision. Solving for the optimal policy rules in working age is a compu-
tationally intensive procedure, since a large number of those rules must be
calculated for each period. Continuous approximation speeds up computa-
tion a lot also at this stage as well, but computation time is still about 2
hours per period. Once the optimal policy rules are computed, aggregation
and the simulation of a large number of individuals do not increase compu-
tation time by much. In order to perform the simulations we ﬁx a random
draw of wage and business return shocks for each agent and compute opti-
mal paths using the policy rules computed before. Most statistics are based
on this sample of time series paths for consumption and asset holdings. To
compute some of the reported statistics, such as the share of entrepreneurs in
the economy, we draw a random population sample using the CPS weights
from this sample of time series to obtain a representative cross-section of
agents.
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Fixed parameters
γ 2
β 0.97
r 0.025
φ 0.473
σ2
ξ 0.077
gl 0.01
40TABLE 2:
Calibrated parameters
¯ ρ 0.13
θ 0.88
σ2
ζ 0.005
Φ 1.8
ρ 0.15
41TABLE 3:
Pension system parameters
M 9
¯ v 0.623
τ 0.125
42